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ABSTRACT 
 
Modeling the Effects of Grade Retention in High School* 
 
A dynamic discrete choice model is set up to estimate the effects of grade retention in high 
school, both in the short- (end-of-year evaluation) and long-run (drop-out and delay). In 
contrast to regression discontinuity designs, this approach captures treatment heterogeneity 
and controls for grade-varying unobservable determinants. A method is proposed to deal with 
initial conditions and with partial observability of the track choices at the start of high school. 
Forced track downgrading is considered as an alternative remedial measure. In the long-run, 
grade retention and its alternative have adverse effects on schooling outcomes and, more so, 
for less able pupils. 
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1 Introduction
Grade repetition is practiced in many OECD countries. In 2009 in the OECD on average
13% of 15-year-olds are reported to have repeated at least one year either in primary or
high school (OECD, 2012). This practice is very unevenly distributed. In France, Lux-
embourg, Spain, Portugal and Belgium more than 30% of the 15-year-olds are reported
to have some delay in their school curriculum. In contrast, in the Scandinavian countries
and in the United Kingdom more than 95% are on time at that age. Different societies
seem, therefore, to have very different views on the effectiveness of grade retention as
a remediation for unsatisfactory performance of pupils. For instance, in some countries,
like France, a consensus has grown that grade repetition is bad and the government has
taken actions to make schools accountable for overuse OECD (2012, p. 55). By contrast,
in other countries, such as in the United States (US), there has been a revival of poli-
cies supporting retention in case a certain level of academic achievement is not attained
by third grade (Schwerdt et al., 2015). Hence, the practice of grade repetition remains
controversial and heavily debated.
Also in the scientific literature, arguments pro and contra grade retention are debated.
Proponents argue that by repeating the same grade, low-achieving students have extra
time to catch up to the grade-level requirements, both in terms of knowledge and emo-
tional maturity. By having more time to develop the skills needed in the subsequent
grades, students would be less at risk of failure in the future and may even, relative to
the counterfactual of promotion to the next grade, increase competencies and earnings in
the long-run (Eide and Showalter, 2001). Moreover, the threat of retention might be an
incentive device to work more diligently and harder (Manacorda, 2012). Opponents, by
contrast, stress the personal and academic costs associated to grade retention. It might
(i) hurt pupils’ self-esteem (Browman, 2005; Byrd et al., 1997), (ii) generate psycholog-
ical costs of separating students from their peers (Alexander et al., 1994), (iii) produce
financial costs to the families and to society in terms of teaching resources (Eide and
Goldhaber, 2005), and (iv) induce lower earnings because of the delayed entry into the
labor market, but also because retention can be a negative signal to employers and, hence,
lead to lower wages (Brodaty et al., 2013).
Many empirical studies have tried to deliver more insights into this debate by estimat-
ing the impact of grade repetition on test scores of academic achievement, but also on
other outcomes, such as school drop-out, wage and, recently,1 on juvenile crime . The es-
timation of the causal impact is, however, complicated by selection bias. Retained pupils
are more likely to have a lower innate ability and weaker social background than pro-
1See e.g. Depew and Eren (2015).
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moted students. If these characteristics are not observed by the researcher, the estimates
of the impact of grade retention on educational achievements tend to be biased down-
wards. The early literature indeed mostly found negative achievement effects of grade
retention (Holmes, 1989), although less so in studies that matched treated and control
students on measures of ability or academic achievement (Allen et al., 2009).
More recent studies, based on Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD),2 Instrumen-
tal Variables (IV)3 and factor analytic dynamic models (FADM) (Carneiro et al., 2003;
Heckman and Navarro, 2007)4 also take selection on unobservables into account. These
studies, but not all, generally find more positive short-run effects on (test scores of) aca-
demic achievement, in particular if retention occurs early in primary school. However, in
the long-run, effects on test scores and high school completion remain negative or are, at
most, neutral in case of early retention in primary school.5,6
In the present study we examine the short- and long-run effects of grade retention in
high school on educational achievement in Flanders, the Dutch speaking region in the
North of Belgium. The Flemish case is particularly interesting for the following reasons.
The PISA studies that measure since 2000 the academic achievements of 15-year-olds
in a wide range of OECD countries show that the average performance in the assessed
skills of Flanders has been persistently close to top. On the other hand, in Flanders the
spread in the scores is also much higher than in most other countries and educational
performance is highly segmented according to social background.7 Retention is a very
2Jacob and Lefgren (2004) and Jacob and Lefgren (2009) use RDD to evaluate respectively short- and
long-run effects of grade repetition in Chicago Public Schools, Manacorda (2012) for high school students
in Uruguay, Greene and Winters (2007) and Schwerdt et al. (2015) for third graders in Florida and Depew
and Eren (2015) for fourth and eighth graders in Louisiana.
3Eide and Showalter (2001) evaluate grade repetition in high schools in several states in the US, Alet
et al. (2013) and D’Haultfœuille (2010) study retention respectively in first-second grade and in fifth grade
in France. Dong (2010) uses a control function approach (which is equivalent to IV) to estimate the effect
of repeating Kindergarten in the US.
4Fruehwirth et al. (2014) study the effect of retention in the US between kindergarten and fourth grade.
Gary-Bobo et al. (2014) consider sixth to eighth graders in France.
5The study of Eide and Showalter (2001) finds positive effects on high school completion and on labor
market earnings, but these were very imprecisely estimated and not statistically significantly different from
zero.
6The aforementioned studies evaluate the ex-post effect of retention. These disregard, however, that
the ex-ante threat of retention may encourage students to study harder in order to avoid grade repetition
(Manacorda, 2012). Foureaux Koppensteiner (2014) finds that the introduction of an automatic promotion
system in Brazilian high schools, removing this deterrence effect, significantly reduces academic achieve-
ment. However, conversely, Belot and Vandenberghe (2014) tentatively conclude that the reintroduction of
grade repetition in grade 7 in high school of the Belgian French speaking Community did not lead to better
medium-run outcomes among those most at risk of grade repetition.
7Source: Department of Education, Ghent University (www.pisa.ugent.be/nl/resultaten/
vlaamse-publicaties).
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popular remedial measure in Flanders. In the school year 2014-15 on average 4.6% of
all high school students were retained. In earlier years, which this study refers to, this
figure was even higher.8 We are interested in knowing which role retention has played
in the aforementioned high, but unevenly distributed, performance of the Flemish school
system.
A particular feature of the Flemish high school system is that it consists of very hi-
erarchically ordered tracks that students enter at the start, generally at the age of twelve.
This has been labeled the cascade-system, since many pupils start off in a high track and
gradually downgrade, i.e. trickle down the cascade. Upgrading from a lower to a higher
ordered track is not possible. Downgrading can be a free choice of the student, or imposed
by the staff meeting of teachers at the end of the school year if a student did not pass the
exams in the main subjects of the track she attended. The imposed downgrading is an
alternative remedial measure that avoids grade repetition by reorienting the student to a
less demanding track. In this case the student can still decide to stay in the high track,
but then she is forced to repeat the grade. The aim of this paper is to study the effect of
grade retention within this cascade system and also to compare it to track downgrading.
Other countries also separate students into different tracks OECD (2012, p. 58-60), so that
downgrading as remediation is not only of interest to the Flemish educational system.
Using data from retrospective surveys conducted on representative samples of youth
belonging to the 1978 and 1980 birth cohorts, we estimate the average treatment effects of
grade repetition on retained pupils in eighth, ninth and tenth grade (i.e. the second, third
and fourth grade of high school in Flanders). To that purpose, we model and estimate
the sequence of decisions that these students (or their parents) take throughout their high
school career each time at the end of the schooling year: track choice (only at the start of
high school), the decision to drop-out of school (only at ages when schooling is no longer
compulsory), the decision to repeat the grade or not and the decision to downgrade or not.
These students’ decisions are conditional on the teachers’ overall end-of-year evaluations:
pass (A), forced downgrade (B) or fail (C). These teachers’ evaluations are also modeled
and estimated based on past schooling outcomes.
Our approach fits into the aforementioned FADM and is, hence, most comparable to
the work of Fruehwirth et al. (2014) and Gary-Bobo et al. (2014). A common feature of
this approach is that it exploits the panel structure of the data to identify not only selection
on unobservables, but also essential heterogeneity in the treatment effect (Heckman et al.,
2006). The key identifying assumption is that unobserved determinants of both treatment
and outcomes are assumed to be captured by a low dimensional set of common causes
8Source: Flemish Ministry of Education (www.ond.vlaanderen.be/onderwijsstatistieken/
rapporten).
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(Fruehwirth et al., 2014, p. 14). Since, contrary to Fruehwirth et al. (2014), we do not
have separate measurements of the multidimensional unobserved ability, we restrict the
factor structure of these unobservables to be unidimensional. An advantage of imposing
this low dimensional factor structure is that it enables, in addition, to take time-varying
unobserved determinants into account.9 We allow for grade-varying unobserved hetero-
geneity. This is important in our analysis, because this can capture the impact of the
changing environment (school, classroom and peer effects) over grades.10
Our paper also contributes methodologically to the FADM-approach. First, we face an
initial conditions problem, because pupils may already have been retained in kindergarten
or primary school.11 In order to take into account that this early retention may also affect
the outcomes in high school, we follow the approach proposed by Wooldridge (2005) and
condition the unobserved heterogeneity distribution on the number of years of schooling
delay at the start of high school. Second, we do not only consider educational achievement
as outcome (as the other authors using the FADM approach), but also the high school
drop-out (as, e.g., Jacob and Lefgren, 2009), the average delay by grade (as, e.g., Schwerdt
et al., 2015) and the attained track level. Considering not only educational achievement
as outcome, but also other (long-term) outcomes is important, because the effect of grade
retention has been shown to be more negative on the latter than on the former. Third, by
explicitly modeling tracking and the imposed downgrading, we can contrast the relative
efficacy of retention and (forced) downgrading. Finally, we propose a method to deal
with a problem of partial observability that we face at the start of high school. In the
analysis we distinguish five different tracks, but we can only observe the chosen track
from eighth grade onwards. In grade 7 we can only observe a more global division into
three tracks. To do so we follow a similar approach as Mroz et al. (2015) who account for
partial observability of the onset time of a disease by integrating over all possible onset
times. We integrate the likelihood function over the possible tracks that could have been
chosen in grade 7 given the observed choice in grade 8.12
We find that grade retention has a neutral effect on the evaluation in the next grade.
In contrast, the long-term effects are largely adverse. Pupils repeating (for the first time)
grade 8 have a 14 percentage point lower chance to graduate from high school. Alternative
9Gary-Bobo et al. (2014) do not allow for this.
10Because of the relatively small sample size and because each year only a relatively small fraction of
the pupils repeat the grade, allowing for year-varying instead of grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity
was not feasible.
11In contrast to many other countries, in Flanders pupils can be retained multiple times. We explicitly
allow for this in the analysis.
12Contrary to Mroz et al. (2015), we exploit that the information available in the future observed out-
comes and in the cascade nature of track choices in the Flemish high school system to weigh in this inte-
gration the possible track choices by their probability of occurrence.
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timing of the retention, i.e. in grade 9 or 10, does not affect these treatment effects.
Retention causes an increased likelihood of downgrading both in the short-run, by the
next grade, and, although slightly less, in the longer run, by the last year of compulsory
education. By this last year the likelihood of being in the highest track is 14 percentage
points lower, while that of being in the lowest track is enhanced by the same amount. In
line with the research based on RDD, we find that students who are at the margin of being
retained increase their academic achievement in the short-run. However, as Fruehwirth
et al. (2014), we find that retention of the lowest ability students decreases the academic
achievement and drives the significantly positive effect on high school drop-out. When
comparing retention to track downgrading as an alternative remedial measure, we observe
a slightly more adverse effect on the academic achievement in the short-run and on high
school drop-out, but the difference is not statistically significant. The main difference is
that the delay in the last compulsory school year is much reduced in case of downgrading.
Relatively to allowing students to unconditionally pass to the next grade (awarding an A),
this remedial might stimulate academic achievement in the short-run, but this advantage
disappears in the longer run. Overall, we conclude in line with the existing literature that
retention is an inadequate remedial measure. Moreover, downgrading in a hierarchical
tracking system does not perform sufficiently better. Policy recommendations are clear:
stop retention and downgrading.
This study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the Flemish (Belgian)
educational system with a focus on the functioning of high school. Section 3 describes
the data and summarizes basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical
analysis. Section 4 presents the econometric model. Section 5 reports our empirical
findings, which are quantified on the basis of counterfactual simulations. Finally, Section
6 concludes.
2 The Flemish High School System
Flanders is the Dutch speaking region of Belgium, situated in the Northern part of the
country. Belgium is a federal country with several competencies devolved to its three
Regions (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) and three Communities (Dutch, French and
German speaking). While the federal authorities are competent for all matters of National
importance, territorial and person-related issues are left to Regions and Communities.
Since 1988, the Flemish Community is in charge of all aspects of education policy in
Flanders.
Compulsory education starts on 1 September of the year in which the child turns 6
5
years old and ends on 30 June of the year in which (s)he reaches the age of 18.13 The
start of compulsory education coincides with the beginning of primary school. However,
children might start one or more years earlier if in kindergarten they are suggested to do
so.14 Grade retention and grade skipping are also allowed in primary school. Hence,
pupils start high school at different ages. The regular starting age is the year in which
they turn 12. In our research sample outlined in the next section, only 1.1% started high
school in the year they turned 11 and 3.7% started with delay.
In the beginning of high school students are grouped in hierarchical tracks according
to their abilities and interests. This is a quite common practice in OECD countries to take
the diversity of skills and educational preferences of pupils into account. In this study, as
in Van de gaer et al. (2006) and Van Houtte et al. (2012), we refer to tracking as a system
in which students are allocated to different pathways, i.e. tracks, in which they are taught
entirely different curricula and may be denied to pursue a track in case of unsatisfactory
performance. This differs from setting or banding, when pupils in the same curriculum
are taught at different difficulty levels according to their ability (Gamoran et al., 1995). In
Flemish high school, four main tracks can be distinguished: (i) the general track (GHS)
provides a primarily theoretical general preparation for higher education; (ii) the technical
track (THS) consist of a mix of theoretical and practical classes aiming at both direct
labor market entry after completion or entry in primarily technical higher education; (iii)
the vocational track (VHS) teaches practical skills that prepare for particular professions;
from age 15 or 16, students in this track may move to part-time education, in which formal
classroom training can be combined with on-the-job training; (iv) the arts track (AHS)
combines general education with active arts practice. In this study, we neither consider
AHS, nor part-time education in VHS, because too few pupils in our sample choose it.
Students graduate from high school if they successfully pass the six grades of GHS or
THS or the seven grades of VHS. All high school graduates can enter higher education
without passing any central entry exam, except for the study of medicine.
Track mobility in high school is possible at the start of each academic year, but it is
constrained in the following two ways. First, tracks are hierarchical with the following or-
dering from high to low: (i) GHS, (ii) THS and (iii) VHS. It is only possible to move down
these tracks, not upwards.15 Moreover, within GHS and THS, a further division of hierar-
13From the age of 15 (conditional on passing the first two years of full-time high education) or 16
(unconditionally), only part-time education is mandatory.
14The choice to send children to primary education is formally made by their parents. However, in
practice, parents follow teachers’ judgment of whether their child is school ready (Baert and Cockx, 2013).
In our sample, 1.4% of children started primary school in the year they turned 5 and 1.1% started it when 7
or 8.
15According to the rules, not forbidden to move upwards but, in practice, this is not feasible because
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chically ordered sub-tracks can be identified. We label these, respectively, GHS+/GHS−
and THS+/THS−.16 A second constraint is that track changes are not permitted between
the before last and last grade, i.e. between grade 11 and 12 in GHS and THS and between
grade 12 and 13 in VHS.
At the end of each academic year, pupils receive an evaluation: A, B or C. Pupils
getting an A are promoted to the next grade and, if they wish, can downgrade the track.
Pupils obtaining a C must repeat the grade and, if they wish, can downgrade the track.
Pupils who have been awarded a B are forced to downgrade in case they want to be
promoted to the next grade. They can only avoid track downgrading by repeating the
same grade.
3 Data and Sample
We base our analysis on a survey conducted on two random samples of respondents, one
born in 1978 and the other in 1980. Each sample consisted originally of about 3,000
individuals. These individuals were surveyed at the age of 23.17 They were asked to
provide information on some strictly exogenous characteristics (such as gender, birth date,
parents’ level of education and number of siblings), as well as years in which they started
primary school, and year-by-year detailed retrospective information on their high school
career: track choices, end-of-year evaluations (A, B or C) and timing of school drop-out
or graduation. The data lack information on school and class characteristics and on the
place of living within Flanders. The information on higher education and labor market
participation is not used in this research.
The original sample contains 5, 915 pupils. In order to have a sample of pupils with
a homogeneous educational, social and family background, we removed from the sample
pupils whose grandmother on mother’s side had a foreign nationality (583 pupils deleted),
pupils who need special help, temporarily or permanently, and were therefore in special
schools, and pupils who started high school when older than 15 (473 pupils deleted). As
aforementioned, we also dropped students entering the arts track (103 students), those
reporting a break of one or more years in high school attendance, those leaving school
before the end of compulsory education (9 pupils), those ending in part-time education
students would not have the pre-requirements for certain courses of the higher tracks.
16More concretely, GHS+ comprises the curricula including Latin and/or Ancient Greek and THS+
comprises the curricula focused on industrial sciences and on commerce.
17The survey was conducted by the so called SONAR research team. The team also surveyed the 1976
birth cohort, but because no detailed information on school tracks was available for this cohort, it was not
retained in our analysis. The 1978 cohort was also interviewed at age 26 and the 1980 cohort at 29, but
since these surveys did not add any information on the high school career, they were neglected.
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(183 students), those with inconsistent or missing information on the progression of the
grade, evaluation and grade mobility (397 pupils) and those with missing values for some
of the covariates used in the econometric model outlined in the following section (146
students). Since only 42 students were retained in first grade and only 46 students made
track transitions involving more than two steps, we deleted their records from our sample.
After applying these selection criteria, we ended up with a sample of 3, 933 pupils who
were observed in each year of their high school career.
Table 1: The Panel Structure of Our Sample
Absolute frequency Relative frequency (%)
Distribution of the number of multiple observations of pupils
5 6 0.15
6 2, 824 71.80
7 861 21.89
8 200 5.08
9 37 0.94
10 4 0.10
11 1 0.02
Total 3, 933 100.00
Distribution of the number of grade observations in the pooled sample
1 3, 933 15.74
2 4, 094 16.39
3 4, 121 16.49
4 4, 178 16.72
5 4, 288 17.16
6 4, 003 16.02
7 368 1.47
Total 24, 985 100.00
Table 1 clarifies the panel structure of our sample. In the top panel we tabulate the
number of years in high school and the corresponding number and fraction of individuals
in the retained sample. Most students are observed during six years, the typical duration of
high school in case of regular promotion in each grade. Because students can be retained
multiple times, students are observed up to 11 years in high school. No student stays
less than five years in high school. This is a consequence of compulsory schooling until
age 18 and because very few pupils have started high school beyond the age of 13. The
bottom panel of Table 1 reports the distribution of observations over each high school
grade. Having multiple observations per grade will help in identifying the grade-varying
unobserved heterogeneity (Section 4.5). The total number of year observations in our
sample is 24, 985, i.e. 6.35 years per individual on average.
Table 2 displays summary statistics of schooling attainment and choices modeled in
the empirical analysis. In the first columns overall statistics referring to the whole sample
are reported. The subsequent columns refer to the subsamples of pupils who have never
repeated a grade and those who have repeated a grade at least once in high school. First,
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we report some outcomes and decisions at the end of the schooling year averaged over
the high school career. In our sample on average in each year 91.4% of the pupils get an
A, the highest evaluation, while 4.6% and 3.7% obtain a B and a C, respectively. Pupils
who have never repeated a grade realize far much better evaluations than those who did
repeat at least one grade. Around 4.4% of the pupils are retained on average at the end
of the academic year.18 Over the high school career this leads to 874 out of the 3,933
pupils (22.2%) being retained at least once (see Table 3 below). On average 91.7% of the
students graduate with a high school diploma. However, 14.9% of the students who repeat
a grade at least once drop-out from high school. 91.7% of the pupils never change track,
while each year on average 6.4% start the academic year with a one-step track downgrade
and 1.9% with a two-step downgrade. Repeaters are only marginally more likely than
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Outcome Variables: Schooling Attainment and
Choices
Whole sample No repetition Grade repetition
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Outcomes and decisions at the end of the year§
Evaluation: A 0.914 0.280 0.966 0.181 0.763 0.425
Evaluation: B 0.049 0.215 0.032 0.176 0.096 0.295
Evaluation: C 0.037 0.189 0.002 0.045 0.141 0.348
Retention 0.044 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.174 0.379
High school graduation with diploma 0.917 0.276 0.939 0.239 0.851 0.356
No downgrade 0.917 0.276 0.925 0.263 0.894 0.308
One-step downgrade 0.064 0.245 0.060 0.237 0.076 0.265
Two-step downgrade 0.019 0.136 0.015 0.119 0.122 0.171
Cumulative delay (years)
Cumulative delay at the beginning of grade 7 0.027 0.217 0.028 0.217 0.022 0.210
Cumulative delay at the beginning of grade 8 0.027 0.217 0.028 0.217 0.022 0.210
Cumulative delay in the last year of high school 0.309 0.619 0.028 0.217 1.289 0.568
Track at the beginning of grade 7
GHS/THS 0.951 0.215 0.953 0.212 0.945 0.228
VHS 0.049 0.215 0.047 0.212 0.055 0.228
Track at the beginning of grade 8
GHS+ 0.275 0.447 0.329 0.470 0.116 0.320
GHS− 0.409 0.492 0.386 0.487 0.476 0.499
THS+ 0.101 0.301 0.084 0.277 0.151 0.358
THS− 0.137 0.344 0.123 0.328 0.177 0.382
VHS 0.078 0.268 0.077 0.267 0.080 0.271
Track at the end of high school
GHS+ 0.142 0.349 0.177 0.382 0.022 0.147
GHS− 0.381 0.486 0.411 0.492 0.279 0.449
THS+ 0.109 0.312 0.097 0.296 0.150 0.357
THS− 0.214 0.410 0.174 0.379 0.356 0.479
VHS 0.153 0.360 0.142 0.349 0.193 0.395
Number of pupils 3, 933 3, 059 874
Number of pupils × number of years of schooling 24, 985 18, 622 6, 363
§ The statistics of the presented outcomes and decisions are yearly averages over the high education career.
18This figure is in line with the figures reported in OECD (2004, p. 262) for the whole Belgium.
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non-repeaters to experience a one-step downgrade (7.6% versus 6.0%), but the likelihood
of a two-step downgrade is much higher: 12.2% against 1.5%.
Second, Table 2 displays the average cumulative delay at the beginning of grade 7,
grade 8 and in the last year of high school (which is prior to graduation for those who
drop-out early). At the beginning of high education, the average number of years of
schooling delay is 0.03. By the end of high school pupils have been on average retained
during 0.31 years. For those who have repeated at least one grade, the delay is on average
1.29 years. Note that the delay only starts to accumulate beyond grade 8: no one repeats
grade 7.
Third, Table 2 reports the relative frequency of track choices at the beginning of grade
7 and grade 8. At the beginning of grade 7, we have only partial information about the
school track choice. We only know whether the student is in the vocational track (VHS) or
not (i.e. in GHS or THS). This partial observability generates a complication in modeling
track choices at the start of grade 7 and subsequent downgrades. We explain how we deal
with this in Subsection 4.4. We have more detailed information on the tracks only starting
from grade 8. From this grade onwards, we can group track choices into five hierarchical
categories: GHS+, GHS−, THS+, THS− and VHS. At the beginning of grade 7, 4.9% of
pupils choose VHS. As a result of some downgrading decisions, this frequency increases
up to 7.8% when moving to grade 8; 27.5% are instead in GHS+, 40.9% in GHS− and
the remaining 23.8% is split almost evenly between THS+ and THS−. By the end of
high school the fraction in the higher tracks has substantially decreased in favor of the
lower tracks. For instance, by the end of high school the fraction in GHS+ is about half
of what it was at the start of grade 8, while the fraction in VHS has about doubled. This
is a consequence of the important degree of downgrading in Flemish high school. This
downgrading is highly correlated with grade repetition. For instance, at the start of high
school the fraction in VHS was roughly equally distributed over the two subsamples,
while at the end of high school the fraction in VHS was clearly higher in the group that
repeated at least one grade.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of the strictly exogenous covariates conditioned
upon in the econometric analysis. About one half of the sample is female and the average
day of birth is close to the middle of the calendar year. Out of the 3, 933 pupils in our
sample, 1, 967 are born in 1978 and 1, 966 are born in 1980. Almost one half of the
pupils have one sibling, 13.6% are only child and 39.3% have more than one sibling.
Pupils’ fathers are more educated than pupils’ mothers, having on average 6.3 years of
successful education beyond primary school against 5.9 years for mothers. The parents of
the pupils who experienced grade repetition are lower educated on average than the pupils
who were systematically promoted from one year to the next. This reflects the selection
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Covariates at the Beginning of High School
Whole sample No repetition Grade repetition
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female 0.512 0.500 0.549 0.498 0.382 0.486
Calendar day of birth 183.671 104.225 182.532 104.011 187.660 104.931
Father’s education after primary school (years) 6.342 3.318 6.406 3.330 6.116 3.266
Mother’s education after primary school (years) 5.931 2.990 6.007 3.000 5.666 2.939
Cohort
1978 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
1980 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500
Presence of siblings
0 0.136 0.343 0.136 0.343 0.136 0.343
1 0.471 0.499 0.472 0.499 0.468 0.499
2 0.258 0.437 0.259 0.438 0.254 0.436
3 or more 0.135 0.342 0.133 0.339 0.142 0.349
Number of pupils 3, 933 3, 059 874
problem mentioned in the Introduction.
4 The Econometric Model
In this section, we write down the econometric model. Schooling choices of pupils and
teachers are taken sequentially over time. We exploit this sequentiality together with the
assumption that there are some common unobservable (grade-varying) variables, inde-
pendent of the strictly exogenous observed explanatory variables, to identify the causal
relationship of past choices (e.g. the end-of-year evaluation) on subsequent schooling
outcomes (i.e. subsequent choices). In a first subsection we make these assumptions
explicit for an unspecified joint distribution of choices conditional on aforementioned ob-
servable and unobservable variables, and on initial conditions. Based on these general
assumptions, we derive the likelihood function. In the following subsection, we clarify
our modeling assumptions regarding each of the schooling choices by pupils and teachers.
In subsection 4.3 we explain how we restrict the (grade-varying) unobserved heterogene-
ity distribution. In Subsection 4.4 we discuss how we deal with the problem that we
observe the track choice at the start of high school only partially. Finally, in Subsection
4.5 we briefly argue why based on our modeling assumptions the unknown parameters
are identified.
4.1 General Model Assumptions and the Likelihood Function
Given the set-up of the Flemish high school system, there are different choices that pupils
(or/and their parents) have to make. At the start of high school they must first choose
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the track in which they commence. Then, at the start of each academic year, they must
choose, based on the end-of-year evaluations (A, B or C), whether to repeat the grade
or not (only in case of a B) and whether to downgrade the track or not. From age 18
onwards, schooling is no longer compulsory, so that pupils can, from that point onwards,
also choose to drop-out of school. Formally, these choices by pupils and teachers (i.e.
their evaluations) can be represented by five discrete outcome variables for each pupil i
(i = 1, . . . , N ) in each academic year t (t = 1, . . . , Ti):
• tri: track choice at the beginning of high school. Since tracks are hierarchically
ordered, tri is an ordered response taking on the increasing values {VHS,THS−,
THS+,GHS−,GHS+}.
• evit: evaluation at the end of each academic year t. This is an ordered response
taking on the following increasing values {C,B,A} if pupils are not in the last grade
or if they are not in the lowest track VHS. Alternatively, if the student is in the last
grade year or in the VHS track, the regulations impose (Section 2) that the ordered
response can take on two values only: C or A .
• outit: school drop-out at the end of year t from age 18 onwards (i.e. the end of
compulsory schooling age). outit is an indicator equal to 1 if student i drops out of
school in year t, 0 otherwise.
• reit: choice to repeat the grade in year t+ 1 if the evaluation at the end of year t is B
(evit = B). reit is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the student chooses to repeat
the grade when (s)he gets a B, 0 if (s)he chooses instead to downgrade.
• dowit: choice to downgrade the track in year t + 1. This choice is in most cases
defined as an ordered response, taking on values {0, 1, 2}, where 0 means ‘no down-
grade’, 1 stands for ‘one-step downgrade’ and 2 is ‘two-step downgrade’. When
pupils are in VHS, which is the lowest track, they cannot downgrade further, so
there is no choice to be taken. If they are in THS−, they cannot make a ‘two-step
downgrade’ and their choice is dichotomous, either ‘no downgrade’ or ‘one-step
downgrade’.
Four out of five of these choice variables are observed at the end of each academic year
t, resulting in multiple observations for each individual. Only the track choice at the
beginning of high school, tri, is observed just once. Moreover, the track choice is only
partially observed, a point to which we return in Subsection 4.4.
As mentioned Section 3, pupils start high school at different ages due to different past
retention histories either in primary school or in kindergarten. If we allow for past per-
formance, like past grade retention, to affect future outcome variables, we have an initial
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conditions problem. The cumulative years of delay at the beginning of high school, ini,
cannot be assumed to be exogenous, since they can be correlated to the unobserved deter-
minants. Heckman (1981) proposes to solve the initial conditions problem by explicitly
modeling the years of delay at the beginning of high school as a function of observed
and unobserved determinants. However, we follow the alternative solution proposed by
Wooldridge (2005). This consists in conditioning on the delay at the start of high school
and to integrate out the unobserved heterogeneity conditional on this delay. We opt for
Wooldridge’s (2005) solution for two reasons. The first one is a practical one. Since we
already model five different outcomes, Wooldridge’s (2005) correction allows us to avoid
the inclusion of a sixth to process to be modeled. The second is based on the simula-
tion findings in Akay (2011), who pointed out that Heckman’s (1981) and Wooldridge’s
(2005) methods perform similarly when the number of multiple observations per unit is
larger than 5− 8. Table 1 shows that our panel structure fits to this case.
Let Yit ≡ [evit outit reit dowit] be the row vector collecting the four time-varying
outcome variables, zi be the vector of observed strictly exogenous explanatory variables
and vi a random term capturing the (possibly grade-varying) unobserved determinants of
our outcome variables. We can always write the joint density of (tri,Yi) conditional on
(zi,vi, ini) as:
f(tri,Yi|zi,vi, ini) = f(tri|zi,vi, ini) ·
T∏
t=1
f(Yit|zi,vi,Yit−1, . . . ,Yi1, tri, ini)
≡ f(tri|zi,vi, ini) ·
T∏
t=1
f(Yit|zi,vi,=it−1), (1)
where ini is the initial condition, i.e. the cumulative numbers of years of delay at the
beginning of high school and =it−1 denotes the information set containing all the re-
alizations of the endogenous variables from t − 1 until the start of the processes, i.e.
=it−1 ≡ (Yit−1, . . . ,Yi1, tri, ini).
Assumption 1 (Sequentiality):
Within each academic year t and for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , the four time-varying outcome vari-
ables in Yt are realized sequentially with the following chronological order: evaluation
at the end of the academic year, evt; school drop-out choice, outt; choice to repeat the
grade, ret (choice available only in case of a B); track downgrade choice, dowt.
The aforementioned chronological order is natural. Nevertheless, one might question
the assumption that the choice to repeat the grade in case of a B precedes the downgrading
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decision. Recall that in case of a B, the decision to repeat the grade or not influences the
choice set of downgrading, because a B student who wishes to be promoted to the next
grade cannot stay in the same track. We believe that it is more natural to assume that the
choice of grade repetition comes first, because the decision to be promoted to next grade
just restricts the choice set of the downgrading decision. By contrast, if downgrading is
first decided upon, the choice of downgrading is implicitly mixed up with the decision to
repeat the grade, because if the student decides to stay in the same track, (s)he has implic-
itly simultaneously decided that she will repeat the grade: no choice is left. Nevertheless,
we tested which order in the timing provides a best fit of the data. To that purpose, we
estimated the model under both assumptions and used a Vuong (1989) test to determine
whether one of these two non-nested models could be statistically rejected against the
other. We find that the alternative order of events could be rejected against the one stated
in Assumption 1. The value of the asymptotically standard Normal statistic is 3.544 and
rejects the alternative hypothesis at a p-value of 0.0002.19
Based on Assumption 1, we can rewrite the conditional density in Equation (1) as:
f(tri,Yi|zi,vi, ini) = f(tri|zi,vi, ini) ·
T∏
t=1
[
f(evit|zi,vi,=it−1)
· f(outit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit)sit
· f(reit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit = B, outit = 0)1−lgit
· f(dowit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit, outit = 0, reit)cit
]
, (2)
where sit is an indicator equal to 1 if student i is 18 or older (age from which (s)he can
legally drop-out), lgit is an indicator equal to 1 if the student is attending the last grade
of high school and cit is equal to 1 if the student is in the GHS/THS tracks and 0 if (s)he
is in the VHS track (VHS students do not have the option to downgrade as already at the
bottom of the track hierarchy). We cannot derive the likelihood function on the basis of
the density in Equation (2), because we do not observe vi. Instead, we integrate vi out
after assuming that it is orthogonal to zi, conditional on ini:
Assumption 2 (Orthogonality conditional on ini):
vi ⊥ zi|ini.
Based on Assumption 2 and provided that we parametrically specify the conditional prob-
ability density functions of the outcome variables, we can integrate out the unobservables
19The complete estimation results and calculation of the test statistic can be found in the Internet Ap-
pendix which can be downloaded from the following address: http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/IA_
BCP.pdf.
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vi from the joint probability density function in Equation (2) given a specification of the
conditional cumulative distribution functionG(vi|ini; δi), where δi is a finite dimensional
vector of unknown parameters. Taking the logarithm of this marginal joint probability
density function for each individual i and summing over all the individuals in the retained
sample yields the log-likelihood function:
`(θ, δ) =
N∑
i=1
ln
{∫
R5
f(tri|zi,vi, ini;θtr) ·
T∏
t=1
[
f(evit|zi,vi,=it−1;θev)
· f(outit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit;θout)sit
· f(reit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit = B, outit = 0;θre)1−lgit
· f(dowit|zi,vi,=it−1, evit, outit = 0, reit;θdow)cit
]}
dG(vi|ini; δ)
≡
N∑
i=1
ln
[∫
R5
Li(θ, δ)
]
dG(vi|ini; δ), (3)
where Li(θ, δ) is the individual contribution to the likelihood and θ is the vector of pa-
rameters fully characterizing the probability density functions conditional on vi.
To be able to maximize this log-likelihood we must further impose functional forms
and specify how explanatory variables and past choices affect current high school choices.
In the subsequent subsection we specify the conditional probability density functions of
each high school choice. In addition, we explain how we allow for essential heterogeneity
in the treatment effects (Heckman et al., 2006), i.e. that the treatment effect may depend
on unobservables. In Subsection 4.3 we clarify our assumptions regarding the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution.
4.2 The Empirical Specification of the Educational Choices
We assume that all educational choices can be specified as (ordered) logits. However, the
logit form is not strictly required for identification (Fruehwirth et al., 2014). It is sufficient
that the choices can be written as index models with an additively separable independent
error term, but the logit form is chosen to facilitate estimation.
Assumption 3 (Logit and ordered logit probability density functions):
The probability density functions of the dichotomous and ordered choice variables are
assumed to have a logit forms.
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4.2.1 The Track Choice at the Start of High School
The track choice takes value on {VHS,THS−, THS+,GHS−,GHS+}, which we rela-
bel for notational convenience and to underline their hierarchical ordering by {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
The probability density function of the track choice is an ordered logit determined by a
linear index in the strictly exogenous observed explanatory variables zi, the unobservable
determinants of track choice vi,tr and the initial delay ini:
Pr(tri=1|zi,vi,tr, ini) = Λ(α1,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=2|zi,vi,tr, ini) = Λ(α2,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr)−Λ(α1,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=3|zi,vi,tr, ini) = Λ(α3,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr)−Λ(α2,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=4|zi,vi,tr, ini) = Λ(α4,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr)−Λ(α3,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr),
Pr(tri=5|zi,vi,tr, ini) = 1−Λ(α4,tr−vi,tr−z′iβtr−iniγtr). (4)
The coefficients α1,tr < α2,tr < α3,tr < α4,tr are the ordered threshold parameters.
The identification of the selection on unobservables in the track choice at the start of
high school requires a different assumption than the one for the other choices. In contrast
to the subsequent choices, for the track choice we neither have multiple observations, nor
a differential random timing of the choice. Hence, we assume that there is an exclusion
restriction.
Assumption 4 (Exclusion restriction):
Day of birth in the calendar year is assumed to affect high school choices only through its
effect on ini.
Alet et al. (2013) make a similar assumption. They assume that quarter of birth has
a direct impact on both first grade test score and first/second grade repetition, but not on
subsequent test scores. They justify this by arguing that the existing literature (Bedard
and Dhuey, 2006; Sprietsma, 2010) finds that the relative age has a declining impact over
time and that grade repetition is one of the most powerful channels through which relative
age may have long-run effect on student achievement. When we include day of birth as
a regressor in the 4 subsequent choices, it is statistically significant only the decision to
drop-out from school. The p-value of the joint test of significance is 0.034. If we exclude
the day of birth as a regressor from the drop-out equation, the p-value of the joint test of
significance increases to 0.75.
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4.2.2 The End-of-Year Evaluation
At the end of each academic year, teachers jointly evaluate in a staff meeting the global
academic performance of the pupils in the past year. As mentioned in Section 2, stu-
dents obtain one of the following three scores: A, B or C. An A allows students to be
promoted to the next grade. Students getting a C must repeat the grade. Students with a
B are imposed to downgrade the track, unless they accept to repeat the grade, in which
case they can freely choose to downgrade or not. Because of the natural ordering of
these scores, the staff’s evaluation choices are modeled as an ordered logit, conditional on
both the strictly exogenous observed and unobserved explanatory variables and the past
educational choices of pupils and teachers:
Pr(evit = C|xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1) = Λ
[
α1,ev − φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1)
]
,
Pr(evit = B|xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1) = Λ
[
α2,ev − φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1)
]
−Λ[α1,ev − φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1)],
Pr(evit = A|xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1) = 1− Λ
[
α2,ev − φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1)
]
, (5)
where xi ⊂ zi due to the exclusion restriction mentioned in Assumption 4 and φev(xi,vi,ev,
ini, tri,=it−1) is a linear index in its arguments, capturing the impact of observed and un-
observed determinants, and past educational choices of pupils and teachers.
We consider two different specifications of the linear index φev(·). The first speci-
fication ignores essential heterogeneity in the effect of the past grade repetition on the
evaluation outcome, while the second one explicitly allows for it. In the first specification
the linear index takes the following form:
φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1) = x′iβev + vi,ev + iniγev + Idow′it−1piev + Itr′itηev
+ Igr′itδev + reit−1κev + preit−1ψev
≡ w′itξev + reit−1κev + preit−1ψev, (6)
where
• vi,ev is unobserved heterogeneity affecting the evaluation;
• Idowit−1 = [11(dowit−1) 12(dowit−1)]
′ is a column vector of two indicators that
determine whether the student chooses to downgrade one or two tracks at the end
of the previous academic year (the reference student does not change track): 1A(x)
defines the indicator function that is equal to one if x ∈ A and zero otherwise;
dowit ∈ {0, 1, 2} indicates the number of tracks that individual i chooses to down-
grade at the end of year t in high school;
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• Itrit =
[
1{1}
(
tri − 1{∀t:t>1}(t)
∑t−1
s=1 dowis
)
...1{5}
(
tri − 1{∀t:t>1}(t)
∑t−1
s=1 dowis
)]′
is a column vector of five indicators of the track chosen at the beginning of the t-th
year in high school;
• Igrit =
[
1{1}
(
t− 1{∀t:t>1}(t)
∑t−1
s=1 reis
)
...1{7}
(
t− 1{∀t:t>1}(t)
∑t−1
s=1 reis
)]′
is a
column vector of seven indicators of the grade at the beginning of the t-th year in
high school;
• reit−1 is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i was retained at the end of
the previous academic year t − 1 (repeating the grade therefore in the current year
t) and zero otherwise;
• preit−1 = 1N0
(
1{∀t:t>2}(t)
∑t−2
s=1 reis
)
is an indicator equal to one if the student has
ever repeated a grade in high school in years prior to the (t− 1)th year.
Hence, we allow that past high school choices (=it−1) affect the evaluations in a flexible
way. The coefficient κev is the transitory effect of grade repetition on the subsequent aca-
demic performance, while ψev is the permanent effect. δev and ηev capture that students’
ability to get good evaluations depends on the current grade and track, respectively. Fi-
nally, piev is the (transitory) effect of having downgraded a track on the academic achieve-
ment in the subsequent year.
In the second specification of the linear index φev(·) we allow the short- and long-run
effects of grade repetition to be heterogeneous in observed and unobserved abilities. To
maintain a tractable model, we simplify by interacting reit−1 and preit−1 with the linear
index defined in Equation 6. Since this linear index is also a function of unobservables,
this allows for essential heterogeneity in the treatment effect of grade repetition. The
specification of the linear index is then given by the following expression:
φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1) =w′itξev
(
1 + reit−1κ0ev + preit−1ψ
0
ev
)
+ reit−1κev(1+preit−1ψ0ev)+preit−1ψev(1+reit−1κ
0
ev) (7)
If κ0ev and ψ
0
ev are jointly equal to 0, then we go back to the first specification of the linear
index in Equation (6).
In the last two grades or if a student is in the VHS track, the evaluation is dichotomous,
either A or C. In these cases, the ordered logit model described in Equation (5) collapses
to a logit model with:
Pr(evit = A|xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1) = 1− Λ
[
α2,ev − φev(xi,vi,ev, ini, tri,=it−1)
]
, (8)
and the probability of getting a C is its complement to one.
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4.2.3 The School Drop-Out
In Belgium, compulsory education ends on 30 June of the year in which a student turns
18. From that date onwards, students are at risk of high school drop-out without diploma.
School drop-out is an interesting long-run outcome of grade repetition that, as mentioned
in the Introduction, other authors have considered as well. We model it as a binary choice
in the following way for pupils at risk (sit = 1):20
Pr(outit=1|xi,vi,out, ini, tri,=it−1, evit)=Λ [αout+φout(xi,vi,out, ini, tri,=it−1, evit)] ,
(9)
where, similar to Equation (7),
φout(xi,vi,out, ini, tri,=it−1, evit) = (w′itξout+Iev′itωout)(1+reit−1κ0out+preit−1ψ0out)
+reit−1κout(1+preit−1ψ0out)+preit−1ψout(1 + reit−1κ
0
out), (10)
with Ievit =
[
1{A}(evit) 1{B}(evit)
]
.21 Compared to Equation (7), φout has the extra
argument, Ievit, i.e. the end-of-year evaluation. By the sequential ordering assumed in
Assumption 1, Ievit is predetermined with respect to the drop-out choice, so that it can
be conditioned upon.
4.2.4 The Choice of Repeating the Grade in Case of a B Evaluation
Students getting a B can choose either to repeat the grade or to downgrade the track. The
choice is binary and, conditional on getting a B and on not dropping-out, the probability
of repeating the grade is specified as follows:
Pr(reit = 1|xi,vi,re, ini, tri,=it−1, evit = B, outit=0) =
Λ [αre + φre(xi,vi,re, ini, tri,=it−1)] . (11)
Because we do not have enough B observations to empirically identify heterogeneous
effects of past grade repetition on the current decision to repeat the grade, the function
20Very few students (71, 1.7% of the sample) drop-out of school before the end of the academic year.
In order to simplify the model and the timing of events, in these cases we advance the drop-out date at
the end of the previous academic year, disregarding information on retention and track downgrade of the
uncompleted academic year.
21Because of the limited number of students at risk of a drop-out decision, estimation was only possible
if we grouped students with a B and a C into one category, so that for the drop-out decision the indicator
1{B}(evit) was excluded. For similar reasons a coarser grouping was also imposed on Idowit−1, Itrit and
Igrit. See the Internet Appendix (http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/IA_BCP.pdf) for more details.
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φre(xi,vi,re, ini, tri,=it−1) is parametrized as in Equation (6), excluding thereby the pos-
sibility of heterogeneous retention effects across individuals:
φre(xi,vi,re, ini, tri,=it−1) = w′itξre + reit−1κre + preit−1ψre. (12)
Note that the choice of repeating the grade must be considered neither for students in VHS
nor for those in the last grade, because these students may never obtain a B (see Section
2).
4.2.5 The Track Downgrade
In Belgium, at the beginning of high school, students can choose among different tracks
characterized by different curricula. This tracking system is aimed at grouping students
with similar abilities and preferences. Choosing the right track is important as it will
determine future work and education opportunities. In Belgium track choice matters par-
ticularly, because tracks are hierarchically ordered and students can only move down the
hierarchy. The Belgian system of tracking is therefore often referred to as a ‘cascade’
system.
We model track transitions by defining a categorical ordered dependent variable for
track downgrade. As already mentioned in Section 4.2.2, the variable of interest is de-
noted as dowit ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The values reflect the three possible choices: no downgrade,
one-step downgrade and two-step downgrade. Students in the VHS track are already at
the bottom of the cascade and cannot downgrade further. Consequently, we model track
downgrade only for GHS/THS students. The probability density function of a track down-
grade for GHS and THS+ students is specified as:
Pr(dowit = 0|xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, outit = 0) =
Λ
[
α1,dow − φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)
]
,
Pr(dowit = 1|xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, outit = 0) =
Λ
[
α2,dow − φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)
]
− Λ[α1,dow − φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)],
Pr(dowit = 2|xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, outit = 0) =
1− Λ[α2,dow − φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)]. (13)
20
The function φdow(·) is a linear index similar to the one specified in Equation (7):
φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit) = (w′itξdow + Iev′itωdow + reitτdow + reitIev′itζdow)
× (1 + reit−1κ0dow + preit−1ψ0dow)
+ reit−1κdow(1 + preit−1ψ0dow)
+ preit−1ψdow(1 + reit−1κ0dow). (14)
where reit = 1 for students with a B evaluation who decided to repeat the grade and
reit = 0 otherwise. As a consequence of Assumption 1, reit and evit are predetermined
and, hence, can be conditioned upon. We also allow for interactions between the latter
two variables.
For particular groups of students the choice set is reduced. First, students in THS−
cannot make a two-step downgrade: dowit ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, for these students the ordered
logit reduces to a standard logit:
Pr(dowit = 0|xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, outit = 0) =
Λ
[
α1,dow − φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)
]
, (15)
and the probability of making a one-step downgrade is equal to its complement to one.
Second, students with a B choosing to promote to the next grade are forced to down-
grade, so that dowit ∈ {1, 2}.22 Also in this case the ordered logit simplifies to:
Pr(dowit = 2|xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit, outit = 0) =
1− Λ[α2,dow − φdow(xi,vi,dow, ini, tri,=it−1, evit, reit)], (16)
and the probability of making a one-step downgrade is equal to its complement to one.
4.3 The Unobserved Heterogeneity Distribution
To maximize the log-likelihood function in Equation (3), we must assign some parametric
form to the joint conditional distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, G(vi|ini; δ).
First, we follow Wooldridge (2005) and assume that the correlation between vi and ini
affects the mean only and can, hence, be captured by an additive term in the linear indexes
of the modeled high school choices. A consequence is that the associated coefficients of
ini cannot be given a structural interpretation.
22Students in THS− who are promoted to next grade are forced to downgrade and, hence, the downgrad-
ing choice is not modeled for these students.
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Second, in our preferred econometric specification, we allow vi to be grade-varying
random pupil-specific unobserved determinants of the outcome variables, similarly to
Fruehwirth et al. (2014). The grade-varying unobserved determinants may capture pupils’
heterogeneity in reacting to grade specific characteristics of high school, like teachers,
subject complexities and subject variation. In contrast to Fruehwirth et al. (2014) who
specify the heterogeneity distribution as mixtures of Normal distributions, we avoid too
strict parametric assumptions on the distribution of grade-varying unobserved hetero-
geneity. In line with Heckman and Singer (1984), we assume that the grade-varying
unobserved determinants of the different processes have a discrete cumulative distribu-
tion function G with a finite and, a priori, unknown number M of points of support. Each
support point vm of the discrete distribution is a 5 × 7 matrix, since it is the collection
of 5 column vectors, one for each endogenous process, with one support point for each
of the 7 grades in high school: vm ≡ [vmtr vmev vmout vmre vmdow]′. The first element of vm,
vmtr , is made up of 7 equal scalars since the track choice at the beginning of high school
is observed only in grade 7 and thereby it does not make sense to consider grade-varying
heterogeneity for this outcome variable. Since in our sample nobody drops-out of high
school before grade 9, grade-varying heterogeneity for school drop-out cannot be identi-
fied in the first two grades of high school. The matrix below clarifies the structure of the
m-th point of support of the grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity:
vm ≡

vmtr
vmev
vmout
vmre
vmdow
 ≡

vmtr − − − − − −
vmev,7 v
m
ev,8 v
m
ev,9 v
m
ev,10 v
m
ev,11 v
m
ev,12 v
m
ev,13
− − vmout,9 vmout,10 vmout,11 vmout,12 vmout,13
vmre,7 v
m
re,8 v
m
re,9 v
m
re,10 v
m
re,11 v
m
re,12 v
m
re,13
vmdow,7 v
m
dow,8 v
m
dow,9 v
m
dow,10 v
m
dow,11 v
m
dow,12 v
m
dow,13
 .
If we leave the structure of the points of support to be unrestricted, we would have to
estimate many parameters for each point of support of the discrete distribution. Estimating
our model with such a high-dimensional discrete distribution would be computational de-
manding. It would also be problematic since many support points would be identified on
very few observations. For example, the unobserved determinants of grade 13 would be
based only on those pupils in the VHS track; the identification of the unobserved determi-
nants of school drop-out in grade 9 and 10 would be based only on 1 and 11 observations,
respectively. The most important reason for restricting the dimensions of the points of
support comes, however, from Fruehwirth et al. (2014). They demonstrate that by doing
it, both essential heterogeneity in the treatment effect and time-varying heterogeneity can
be accommodated, if both the treatment (i.e. grade repetition) and the outcome of interest
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(test score in their case) are affected by common unobserved causes. Fruehwirth et al.
(2014) argue that this is important because lower ability students are more likely to be
retained and to learn at a slower pace than high ability students and because unobserved
shocks, such as divorce, that affect both selection into grade repetition and the related
treatment effect.
We therefore impose the following one-factor structure on the unobserved heterogene-
ity distribution:
Assumption 5 (One factor structure):
For every point of support m = 1, . . . ,M , we impose:
• a one-factor loading specification: vmk,g = δk · vmev,g, ∀k ∈ {tr, out, re, dow} for
g = 7, . . . , 13;
• the equality of the support points of grade 12 and 13, i.e. vmev,12 = v
m
ev,13.
Based on Monte Carlo simulations for treatment effects in duration models, Gaure et
al. (2007) find that the numberM of the points of support is best chosen by minimizing the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). We follow this recommendation. The probabilities
associated to the points of support sum to one and are specified as logistic transforms:
pm ≡ Pr(vi = vmi ) =
exp (λm)∑M
h=1 exp (λ
h)
with m = 1, . . . ,M and λM = 0. (17)
The sample log-likelihood function in Equation (3) can be rewritten as
`(θ, δ) =
N∑
i=1
ln
[ M∑
m=1
pmLim(θ, δ)
]
, (18)
where Lim(θ, δ) is the individual contribution to the likelihood function if the individual
is of type m.
4.4 Partial Observability of Track Choices at the Start of High School
As mentioned in Section 3, at the beginning of high school (in grade 7), we have only
partial information about the school track choice. We only know whether students are
in the vocational track (VHS) or not (GHS/THS). Only from grade 8 onward we have
detailed information on courses of study, so that we can group students into the five tracks.
However, the cascade system of the institutional set-up jointly with the track position and
track mobility of each student in subsequent grades convey some information about the
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possible starting track. For example, students who are in GHS+ in grade 8, surely were
also in GHS+ in grade 7, as track upgrading is not allowed. For the same reason, students
in GHS− in grade 8 were not in THS and VHS tracks in grade 7.
We modify the likelihood function to take into account this partial observability of the
track at the beginning of high school taking into account the information regarding future
track positions as well as the institutional restrictions. We integrate over the possible
tracks in grade 7, given future information about tracks and mobility. This is similar to
the strategy used by Mroz et al. (2015) to solve the partial observability of the time in
which persons with diabetes progress to the next disease stage. However, different from
Mroz et al. (2015), the institutional restrictions allow us to exploit more information. We
demonstrate below that this leads to weighing in this integration the possible track choices
by their probability of occurrence, rather than using uniform weights.
To show in what direction we modify the likelihood function and keep the notation
simple, we rewrite the density in Equation (1) by ignoring the conditioning on the ob-
served and unobserved covariates and the individual subscript i, yielding:
f(tr,Y|in) = f(tr|in)f(Y|tr, in). (19)
We assume that the probability of being in each track at the beginning of high school is
related to the information we have in the future on tracks, mobility choices and academic
achievements. Denote by f(tr|in,Y) this probability density function. If we integrate
Equation (19) over the possible tracks, we obtain
f(Y|in) =
∫
f(tr|in)f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in,Y)dtr. (20)
Once we parametrize f(tr|in) and f(Y|tr, in) as in Subsection 4.2, a particular para-
metrization of f(tr|in,Y) is implied:
f(tr|in,Y) = f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)
f(Y|in)
=
f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)∫
f(Y, tr|in)dtr
=
f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)∫
f(Y|tr, in)f(tr|in)dtr . (21)
where the first equality follows from Bayes’ rule, the second one from the definition of
a marginal density, and the third one from the chain rule. Both the numerator and the
denominator of Equation (21) depend indeed on the probability density functions that we
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have already parametrized in Subsection 4.2. Substituting Equation (21) into Equation
(20) yields
f(Y|in) =
∫
f(tr|in)2f(Y|tr, in)2∫
f(Y|s, in)f(s|in)dsdtr. (22)
Since tracks take value on five categories, the integrals in Equation (22) are just sums over
the five possible realisations. The the sample log-likelihood function in Equations (3) and
(18) are modified along the lines dictated by Equation (22).
4.5 Identification
The identification of the interrelated dynamics between grade retention, track mobility
and schooling attainment is difficult. In this subsection we summarize our arguments why
we believe that the aforementioned characteristics of our model ensure identification.
In our analysis the timing of the central treatment of interest, grade retention (i.e. a
C in the end-of-year evaluation), is not fixed, but (partially) randomly determined. The
counterfactual outcomes that we are interested in (the end-of-year evaluations, the drop-
out of high school, the subsequent track choices and the schooling delay) are explicitly
associated to these treatment times. Heckman and Navarro (2007) provide general iden-
tification results for these types of models which do not require exclusion restrictions.23
Fruehwirth et al. (2014) tailor these specifically to the evaluation of grade repetition. The
no anticipations assumption (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003) and the assumption of
common (to the treatment and the outcome) unobserved factors are central in the identi-
fication of these factor analytic dynamic models (FADM). While we discussed the latter
assumption in Section 4.3, we did not yet consider the former.
The no anticipations assumption means that, after conditioning on all prior informa-
tion, grade repetition in grade g + k (∀g ∈ {7, 8, ..., 13} and ∀k : k > 0) may not
directly affect pupil’s schooling outcomes in grade g. This assumption is actually implic-
itly implied by the no sequentiality Assumption 1, because it means that the end-of-year
evaluation which may result in a retention (in case of a C) always precedes the schooling
outcomes of the subsequent year, such as drop-out, downgrading or the evaluation at the
end of the subsequent year. We believe that it is reasonable to assume that pupils cannot
be sure about retention before the end-of-year evaluation and, hence, cannot act in antic-
ipation of that. A similar reasoning applies when we consider different treatments, such
as receiving a B instead of a C as the end-of-year evaluation.
23The methods of Heckman and Navarro (2007) are related to the timing-of-events method proposed by
Abbring and van den Berg (2003). The former is expressed in discrete time whereas the latter in continuous
time.
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Our model is more complicated than those considered by Heckman and Navarro
(2007) and Fruehwirth et al. (2014). First, as just mentioned, we do not only consider a
single treatment, i.e. retention (C) versus no retention (A), but also other treatments, such
as retention (C) versus being forced to downgrade (B). Since these treatments are essen-
tially determined by the same timing, they should not affect the identification arguments.
Second, in the aforementioned studies it is assumed that the treatment (retention) only
realizes once, while in the institutional framework that we consider, the same pupil may
be retained multiple times. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) prove in a similar frame-
work as ours, but in continuous instead of discrete time, that the presence of multiple-spell
data, which corresponds to multiple treatments in our case, relaxes the requirements on
the identifying assumptions. The intuition is similar to the reasoning that having a panel
data set with multiple observations per unit requires fewer identifying assumptions than
a single cross-section. We therefore believe that observing multiple treatments should
facilitate identification rather than impeding it. Third, the track choice at the beginning of
high school is a static choice, so that potential selectivity based on unobservables cannot
be credibly identified on the basis of the aforementioned identification strategy. The one-
factor structure imposed on the unobserved heterogeneity distribution in Assumption 5 is
sufficient for identification, but this would then crucially depend on this functional form
restriction. We therefore believe that the exclusion restriction imposed in Assumption 4 is
a firmer basis for identification. Fourth, in contrast to the aforementioned authors we face
an initial conditions problem, because the process of grade retention can start already in
kindergarten or primary school, while we observe timing of retentions only from the start
of high school. As mentioned in Section 4.1, we solve this initial conditions problem fol-
lowing the methods proposed by Wooldridge (2005). Finally, since the conditional density
functions in Equation (22) are identified on the basis of the aforementioned arguments,
the partial observability problem in Subsection 4.4 should not inhibit identification.
5 Empirical Results
The estimated parameters of the econometric model are reported in an Internet Appendix
which can be downloaded from http://users.ugent.be/~bcockx/IA_BCP.pdf. We
present the estimates of three models: without unobserved heterogeneity, with grade-
constant and with grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity. As mentioned in Section 4.3,
the number of points of support of the discrete one-factor heterogeneity distribution are
chosen such that the AIC is minimized. The resulting number of support points M is 3,
both for the specification controlling for grade-constant and for grade-varying unobserved
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heterogeneity. According to the AIC the latter model is to be preferred. Hence, in this
model is chosen as benchmark in the discussion below.
Since the marginal effects are complicated and their direction and magnitude are not
determined entirely by single estimated coefficients, we prefer not to discuss the estimated
parameters in the main text. Instead, we simulated the model under different counterfac-
tual scenarios of interest to infer the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) of
retentions, relative to unconstrained or constrained promotions, i.e. A or B, in differ-
ent moments of the high school career on future educational outcomes (Subsection 5.2).
However, before reporting these counterfactual simulations, we first use the simulations
to check the performance of our model in terms of goodness-of-fit (Subsection 5.1).
The simulations were conducted as follows. We randomly drew 999 vectors from the
asymptotic Normal distribution of the model parameters. This ensures that the simula-
tions also capture the uncertainty due to estimation. Subsequently, in each of the 999
simulations the drawn parameters were used to calculate the probabilities associated to
each heterogeneity type. These probabilities were then used to randomly assign to each
pupil in the sample a heterogeneity type. Thereafter, based on these random draws of
parameters and heterogeneity types, the full sequence of high school decisions from track
choice at the start of high school until drop-out or high school graduation was simulated
for each pupil in the sample. Each choice was simulated sequentially, based on the chosen
logit specifications reported in Subsection 4.2. To determine the outcome of the choice a
random draw from the standard and, across the sample, independent uniform distribution
was compared to the thresholds that the simulated ordered logits imply. These thresholds
determine segments on the unit interval that correspond to particular choices. The as-
signed choice depends on the segment in which the random number falls. Once a choice
is a assigned it is saved and conditioned upon in the subsequent choice. In each of the
999 simulations this procedure ends if all sampled individuals either have dropped-out or
graduated from high school.
In the sequel, the model prediction of a particular outcome refers to the average of
these 999 simulations. The empirical percentiles provide estimates of the thresholds of
the 95% confidence intervals (CI). Average treatment effects on the treated (ATTs) are
estimated by the average difference between two (counterfactual) outcomes, one in which
the treatment (e.g. a C obtained in a particular grade) is imposed and one in which a coun-
terfactual treatment (e.g. an A or a B) applies. The average is taken over the individuals
who in the simulation are treated.
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5.1 Goodness-of-fit
Table 4 provides an insight into the goodness-of-fit of our preferred model, i.e. the model
with grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity. It allows us to answer the question whether
the simulated proportions, based on the aforementioned parameter sets and simulation
procedure, predict the observed proportions in the data well. More concretely, simulated
and actual fractions are compared (I-III) for school outcomes in grades 8 to 10, i.e. ob-
taining an A in the end-of-year evaluation (broken down by whether or not one repeated
the previous grade for grades 9 and 10) and repeating the grade (forced after a C or cho-
Table 4: Goodness-of-fit
Model: grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity
Actual Simulated 95% CI
probability probability
I. Outcomes in grade 8
A 0.900 0.895 [0.881, 0.909]
Repeating the grade 0.040 * 0.048 [0.039, 0.057]
II. Outcomes in grade 9
A 0.923 0.916 [0.904, 0.929]
Repeating the grade 0.047 0.045 [0.036, 0.054]
A, if repeated grade 8 0.828 0.829 [0.770, 0.888]
A, if did not repeat grade 8 0.927 0.921 [0.908, 0.933]
III. Outcomes in grade 10
A 0.908 0.902 [0.887, 0.915]
Repeating the grade 0.061 0.060 [0.050, 0.071]
A, if repeated grade 9 0.863 0.808 [0.734, 0.871]
A, if did not repeat grade 9 0.910 0.906 [0.892, 0.919]
IV. High school graduation
Diploma 0.915 0.919 [0.906, 0.931]
Diploma, if repeated grade 8 0.720 0.751 [0.675, 0.822]
Diploma, if did not repeat grade 8 0.923 0.927 [0.915, 0.939]
Diploma, if repeated grade 9 0.798 0.796 [0.722, 0.861]
Diploma, if did not repeat grade 9 0.921 0.925 [0.913,0.937]
Diploma, if repeated grade 10 0.825 0.809 [0.744, 0.869]
Diploma, if not repeated grade 10 0.921 0.926 [0.914, 0.938]
V. Years schooling delay at start last compulsory year
Diploma 0.229 0.239 [0.219, 0.260]
Delay, if repeated grade 8 1.261 1.250 [1.173, 1.335]
Delay, if did not repeat grade 8 0.186 0.188 [0.171, 0.207]
Delay, if repeated grade 9 1.202 1.250 [1.169, 1.331]
Delay, if did not repeat grade 9 0.181 0.192 [0.174, 0.210]
Delay, if repeated grade 10 1.200 1.202 [1.144, 1.264]
Delay, if did not repeat grade 10 0.166 0.177 [0.160, 0.194]
Notes: All predictions are based on 999 simulations that allow for the uncertainty of the esti-
mated parameters. The model prediction (simulated probability) is calculated as the average
outcome for these simulations. ***, **, * indicate a significant difference between prediction
and actual outcome at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively.
sen after a B); (IV) high school graduation; and (V) years of schooling delay in the last
compulsory schooling year, i.e. in the school year that ends in the calendar year that the
student becomes 18. We selected these outcomes for a goodness-of-fit analysis, because
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these are the relevant ones in the counterfactual simulations. We report for each of these
outcomes the predicted sample average, as well as the predicted sample average for the
subgroups that repeated grades in one of the preceding years and the groups that did not.
For instance, for the school outcomes in grade 9 we not only report the sample averages,
but also those of the subgroups that were retained in the previous year, i.e. in grade 8.
Actual and simulated probabilities for the mentioned outcomes are very comparable.
Only with respect to repeating the grade after the first year in grade 2, the actual probabil-
ity (4.0%) is different from the simulated probability (4.8%) at a 10% level of significance.
Therefore, we conclude that our model captures the dynamic choices in high school very
well.
5.2 ATTs Based on Counterfactual Simulations
In this subsection, we answer our research questions. We do this by presenting ATTs with
respect to grade repetition, both with a short-term focus (effect in the subsequent grade,
i.e. two years after being retained) and with a long-term focus (effect on high school grad-
uation and on delay at the start of the last compulsory schooling year). In a first step, we
present our benchmark simulation results, i.e. the ATTs of being retained (i.e. obtaining
a C) in grade 8 (the first observed retention in high school) relative to be promoted to the
next grade (i.e. obtaining an A). In a second step, we contrast the results obtained with
our benchmark model with grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity to those obtained if
the heterogeneity is constant over grades or if unobserved heterogeneity is completely
ignored. In a third step, we consider alternative dimensions of the effect of retention: (i)
Does the timing of retention matters (grade 8 compared to grades 9 and 10)? (ii) Does it
affect school track choices? (iii) Is the effect heterogeneous across the treated population?
Finally, we contrast grade retention with the alternative remedial strategy of forced track
downgrading, i.e. we contrast a C with a B.
5.2.1 Benchmark: Short- and Long-Term Effects of Retention in Grade 8
Table 5 presents the average effect of retention in grade 8. In the short-term, the impact on
the evaluation in the next grade, i.e. in grade 9, is virtually zero. This means that grade-
repetition does not improve the academic performance and is therefore ineffective. In the
long-term this adverse outcome is reinforced, because those who were retained in grade
8 are 13.5 percentage points less likely to graduate from high school with a diploma.
In addition, these pupils catch up only marginally relative to the counterfactual of no
retention: their delay at the start of the last compulsory schooling year is only slightly
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Table 5: Benchmark Simulations: The Effects of Retention in Grade 8
Model: grade-varying
Treatment: C versus A evaluation after grade 8 unobserved heterogeneity
———————————–
ATT 95% CI
I. Evaluation in grade 9: A
All treated 0.001 [-0.092, 0.099]
II. High school diploma
All treated -0.135 *** [-0.233, -0.043]
III. Delay at start last compulsory year
All treated 0.904 ** [0.817, 0.991]
Notes: All statistics are based on 999 random simulations of the treated sample that allow for the
uncertainty of the estimated parameters. The ATTs are calculated by subtracting the average outcome
in case of the counterfactual of no grade retention from the average outcome in case of a retention. ***,
**, * indicate whether the ATT is significantly different from 0 (1) in panels I and II (panel III) at the
1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively.
lower than one year. This means that, if the student would have been promoted, (s)he
would not face a particularly higher risk to be retained in a subsequent year than if (s)he
was initially retained.
5.2.2 The Impact of (Grade-Varying) Unobserved Heterogeneity
Comparing Table 5 and Table 6 allows us to judge the bias in the treatment effects when
not controlling for (grade-varying) unobserved heterogeneity. On the one hand, this shows
the standard result that not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity biases in the direction
of more adverse ATTs. On the other hand, this bias seems to be slightly over-corrected
when unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be time constant rather than grade-varying.
Table 6: ATTs of Retention in Grade 8 for Alternative Controls for Unobserved
Heterogeneity
Model: without Model: grade-constant
Treatment: C versus A evaluation after grade 8 unobserved heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
———————————– ———————————–
ATT 95% CI ATT 95% CI
I. Evaluation in grade 9: A
All treated -0.066 [-0.160, 0.024] 0.026 [-0.074, 0.120]
II. High school diploma
All treated -0.168 *** [-0.248, -0.086] -0.126 *** [-0.203, -0.049]
III. Delay at start last compulsory year
All treated 1.023 [0.948, 1.102] 0.850 *** [0.744, 0.940]
Notes: All statistics are based on 999 random simulations of the treated sample that allow for the uncertainty of the
estimated parameters. The ATTs are calculated by subtracting the average outcome in case of the counterfactual of no
grade retention from the average outcome in case of a retention. ***, **, * indicate whether the ATT is significantly
different from 0 (1) in panels I and II (panel III) at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively.
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5.2.3 Alternative Dimensions of the Effect of Grade Retention
In this subsection, we inspect whether the treatment has a different effect when occurring
later, whether it also affects track outcomes and whether it is heterogeneous by the ability
of the pupils. First, we investigate whether the timing of grade retention matters. What
happens if students are retained in a later grade: grade 9 or 10 instead of grade 8? Table
7 presents the results. These differ only marginally from those presented in Table 5. This
suggests that grade retention induces a psychological shock with, irrespectively of the
repeated grade, an immediate adverse impact: if, by contrast, the adverse impact would
have gradually built-up, then the long-term effects of retention in later grades should have
been smaller than in earlier grades.
Table 7: ATTs of Grade Retention: Alternative Timing of Retention
Model: grade-varying unobserved heterogeneity
Treatment: C versus A evaluation Treatment: C versus A evaluation
after grade 9 after grade 10
———————————– ———————————–
ATT 95% CI ATT 95% CI
I. Evaluation in next grade: A
All treated -0.010 [-0.121, 0.098] – –
II. High school diploma
All treated -0.123 *** [-0.219, -0.031] -0.139 *** [-0.228, -0.055]
III. Delay at start last compulsory year
All treated 0.878 *** [0.784, 0.957] 0.868 *** [0.798, 0.930]
Notes: All statistics are based on 999 random simulations of the treated sample that allow for the uncertainty of the
estimated parameters. The ATTs are calculated by subtracting the average outcome in case of the counterfactual
of no grade retention from the average outcome in case of a retention. Panel I is empty for treatments in grade
10 since not all individuals reach grade 11 (and therefore outcomes for the latter year cannot be calculated for all
individuals). ***, **, * indicate whether the ATT is significantly different from 0 (1) in panels I and II (panel III)
at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively.
Table 8 reports the effect of grade retention in grade 8 on track choices, both in the
short-term (in grade 9) and in the long-term (in the last compulsory schooling year). As
to facilitate the presentation, we group the five tracks into three. The findings show that
retention is increasing the likelihood of a track downgrade, and this already in the sub-
sequent grade. In case of retention, the likelihood of being in the general track (GHS)
falls by as much as 18 percentage points, while the likelihood of being in the vocational
track increases by as much as 13 percentage points. Both effects are highly significant.
This might be related to the adverse effect of retention on pupils’ self-esteem mentioned
in the Introduction of this study. In the long-term, i.e. when we consider the impact of
retention on the track choice in the last compulsory schooling year, we observe that the
negative effect on being in the general track is about 5 percentage points less negative than
in the short-term. This suggests that part of the pupils that were retained in the general
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track, would downgrade anyway subsequently, even if they would not have been retained
in grade 8. By contrast, the impact on those in the vocational track does not change over
time.
Table 8: ATTs of Grade Retention in Grade 8 on Track Choice
Model: grade-varying
Treatment: C versus A evaluation after grade 8 unobserved heterogeneity
———————————–
ATT 95% CI
I. Track at start of grade 9: GHS
All treated -0.184 *** [-0.277, -0.106]
II. Track at start of grade 9: THS
All treated -0.051 [-0.054, 0.165]
III. Track at start of grade 9: VHS
All treated 0.132 *** [0.071, 0.210]
IV. Track in last compulsory year: GHS
All treated -0.136 *** [-0.217, -0.067]
V. Track in last compulsory year: THS at least once
All treated -0.005 [-0.106, 0.102]
VI. Track in last compulsory year: VHS
All treated 0.142 *** [0.066, 0.220]
Notes: All statistics are based on 999 random simulations of the treated sample that allow
for the uncertainty of the estimated parameters. The ATTs are calculated by subtracting
the average outcome in case of the counterfactual of no grade retention from the average
outcome in case of a retention. ***, **, * indicate whether the ATT is significantly
different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively.
Similar to Fruehwirth et al. (2014) and Gary-Bobo et al. (2014) we allow the treatment
effect to depend on observed and unobserved characteristics, i.e. we allow for essential
heterogeneity. However, in contrast to the aforementioned authors, we do not consider
the treatment heterogeneity for the full sample, but only for the subsample of treated (i.e.
retained) pupils. We believe that it would be problematic with our data to estimate the
effect of retention on the untreated subsample, because many of them are very unlikely to
be retained: there is no common support.
To obtain some insights in the extent of treatment heterogeneity, we ordered the treated
individuals in each simulation according to the quartiles of the linear index of the evalu-
ation at the end of grade 8 as defined by Equation (7). In Table 9 we report the average
treatment effects of a retention in grade 8 by these quartiles. In line with the research
based on RDD, we find that students who are at the margin of being retained, i.e. those
in the fourth quartile, increase their academic achievement in the subsequent grade, be
it only significant at the 10% level. The ATTs on high school graduation and delay are
also less adverse for this quartile. As Fruehwirth et al. (2014), we find that retention
of the lowest ability students decreases the academic achievement and drives the signifi-
cantly positive effect on high school drop-out and on years of delay in the last compulsory
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schooling year.24 Finally, panel III also suggests that the high ability pupils significantly
reduce the schooling delay by about 20%, while the low ability students do not catch-up
at all.
Table 9: Treatment Heterogeneity of Retention in Grade 8
Model: grade-varying
Treatment: C versus A evaluation after grade 8 unobserved heterogeneity
———————————–
ATT 95% CI
I. Evaluation in grade 9: A
First quartile -0.156 [-0.357, 0.037]
Second quartile 0.001 [-0.149, 0.142]
Third quartile 0.057 [-0.087, 0.171]
Fourth quartile 0.101 * [-0.009, 0.206]
II. High school graduation
First quartile -0.259 *** [-0.451, -0.082]
Second quartile -0.119 [-0.302, 0.034]
Third quartile -0.064 [-0.224, 0.076]
Fourth quartile -0.096 [-0.260, 0.050]
III. Delay at start last compulsory year
First quartile 1.060 [0.876, 1.271]
Second quartile 0.904 [0.750, 1.074]
Third quartile 0.844 ** [0.694, 0.996]
Fourth quartile 0.806 ** [0.662, 0.957]
Notes: All statistics are based on 999 random simulations of the treated sample that allow
for the uncertainty of the estimated parameters. The ATTs are calculated by subtracting
the average outcome in case of the counterfactual of no grade retention from the average
outcome in case of a retention. The first quartile is the one with the lowest value for the
linear index of the evaluation in grade 8. ***, **, * indicate whether the ATT is significantly
different from 0 (1) in panels I and II (panel III) at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels,
respectively.
5.2.4 The Effect of Grade Repetition Relative to Forced Downgrading
In the Flemish setting there are three (A, B and C) instead of two (pass or fail) evaluation
outcomes. This allows to consider the relative performance of grade repetition (C) to
forced downgrading (B)25 as alternative remediation strategy. In Table 10 we present, as in
the previous tables, the ATTs of repeating grade 8. However, instead of contrasting grade
retention to an unconstrained promotion to the next grade (i.e. an A), we now compare it
to obtaining a forced downgrade (i.e. a B). In the short run, a forced downgrade is a better,
though statistically insignificant, strategy than imposing grade repetition. The likelihood
of getting an A in the subsequent grade is 4 percentage points higher in case the student
24Gary-Bobo et al. (2014) by contrast find that the lowest ability students may gain in terms of short-run
academic achievement. However, in line with our findings on drop-out, their likelihood of accessing grade
nine decreases significantly, and more so than higher ability students.
25Recall that downgrading can be avoided by repeating the grade.
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is awarded a B instead of a C. In the short-run, awarding a B seems even more effective
than an A. In the benchmark contrast reported in Table 5, students with a C and an A were
equally likely to be unconditionally promoted in the subsequent grade. This is, however,
not surprising. In the lower track the academic requirements for passing the grade are set
to a lower level.
Table 10: Grade Repetition (C) Relative to Forced Downgrading (B) after
Grade 8
Model: grade-varying
Treatment: C versus B unobserved heterogeneity
———————————–
ATT 95% CI
I. Evaluation in grade 9: A
All treated -0.040 [-0.120, 0.039]
II. High school diploma
All treated -0.050 [-0.140, 0.035]
III. Delay at start last compulsory year
All treated 0.727 *** [0.602, 0.848]
Notes: All statistics are based on 999 random simulations of the treated sample that allow for the uncer-
tainty of the estimated parameters. The ATTs are calculated by subtracting the average outcome in case of
the counterfactual of no grade retention from the average outcome in case of a retention. ***, **, * indicate
whether the ATT is significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively.
In the longer run, for students who were actually forced to repeat the grade, the advan-
tage of awarding a B rather than an A disappears, but it remains a slightly, better strategy
than awarding a C. Awarding a B instead of a C increases the likelihood of high school
graduation by 5 percentage points, but not significantly, while the accumulated delay in
the last compulsory schooling year is, significantly, about 0.7 years shorter. Compared to
the baseline which contrasts a C to an A (Table 5), remediating by a forced downgrade
(a B) does not improve relative to the alternative of allowing promotion to the next grade
(an A).
6 Conclusion
We empirically analyzed the short- and long-term effects of grade retention in high school
on academic performance and high school graduation. To this end we set up a dynamic
discrete model that captures all major high school choices in Flanders, the Dutch speaking
region in the North of Belgium. Based on a rich survey of a sample of pupils born in 1978
and 1980, we estimated the school choices of these high school students based on a factor
analytic dynamic discrete choice model (Carneiro et al., 2003; Heckman and Navarro,
2007). In contrast to regression discontinuity designs, this approach allows to capture
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treatment heterogeneity and to control for grade-varying unobservable determinants. We
contributed to the literature by proposing a method to deal with initial conditions and take
partial observability of track choice at the start of high school into account. Moreover, we
considered forced track downgrading as an alternative remedial measure.
Since the estimation results could not be directly interpreted, counterfactual simu-
lations of the model were used to obtain estimates of the aforementioned treatment ef-
fects. Even if our results indicate that grade retention leads to neutral effects on academic
achievement in the short-run, in the long-run grade retention has adverse effects, because
it leads the higher drop-out rates, substantial schooling delay and downgrading within the
hierarchical tracking system in Flemish high school. In line with the findings of Frue-
hwirth et al. (2014) and Gary-Bobo et al. (2014), we also found substantial heterogeneity
in the effects of grade retention relative to allowing the student to be unconditionally pro-
moted to the next grade. Lower ability students are clearly more adversely affected than
those with higher ability. This is important, because it explains why other studies using
RDD, mentioned in the Introduction, obtained more favorable results. RDDs identify the
treatment effect of higher ability students who are on the margin of being retained. Fi-
nally, our study finds that the alternative remedial measure used in the Flemish schooling
system, namely forced downgrading, can significantly improve academic performance
only in the short-run. In the longer run this alternative reduces, relative to grade retention,
the schooling delay and the high-school drop-out, although not significantly for the latter.
However, these long-run gains disappear when comparing this remediation strategy to the
alternative of having these students unconditionally pass to the next grade. Hence, the
challenge remains to find more successful remediation strategies.
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